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Tax Court Sends Message
On Valuation in Richmond
By Kerry A. Ryan
Estate of Helen P. Richmond1 involved the valua-
tion of an interest in a family-owned personal
holding company for estate tax purposes. Helen
Richmond died in 2005, owning a 23.44 percent
interest in Pearson Holding Company (PHC), a
subchapter C corporation, formed in 1928 to pro-
vide income to the descendants of Frederick Pear-
son.2 As of the date of death, PHC held a $52 million
portfolio consisting mostly of large-cap, high-yield
stocks.3 PHC’s investment philosophy included
preserving capital and maximizing dividend in-
come for the family shareholders.4
This case is significant for three reasons: (1) It
rejects an income-based approach for valuing an
entity holding mainly publicly traded securities; (2)
it reaffirms the Tax Court’s commitment to using a
present value approach in calculating the discount
for the built-in capital gains (BICG) tax liability of a
C corporation; and (3) it imposes an accuracy-
related valuation penalty on an estate that used a
nonspecialized accountant to value a decedent’s
stock interest.
Valuation of PHC
Value for estate tax purposes is the ‘‘price at
which the property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being
under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both
having reasonable knowledge of the relevant
facts.’’5 On Form 706, the estate reported the dece-
dent’s interest in PHC at $3.1 million.6 A notice of
deficiency, issued by the IRS on June 12, 2009,
valued the PHC stock at $9.2 million.7 At trial, the
commissioner and the estate argued that Rich-
mond’s interest in PHC was worth $7.3 million and
$5 million, respectively.8
The court first addressed the proper method to
use in valuing the decedent’s 23.44 percent interest
in PHC. The commissioner’s expert used a dis-
counted net asset value (NAV) approach, whereas
the estate employed an income-based
(capitalization-of-dividends) method to value the
stock.9 Judge David Gustafson held that the NAV
technique was the proper one for valuing a holding
company such as PHC, the assets of which con-
sisted largely of easy-to-value marketable securi-
ties.10 The court suggested that the dividend
capitalization method was more appropriate for
valuing an operating business with many difficult-
to-value assets.11
Both sides agreed that if the NAV method was
used, there should be valuation discounts to reflect
PHC’s contingent BICG tax liability and the lack of
control and marketability associated with the dece-
dent’s PHC interest. The parties disagreed on the
proper amount of these discounts.
Discount for BICG Tax Liability
Since the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, it
is widely accepted that in valuing a C corporation,
some adjustment is appropriate to reflect any BICG
1T.C. Memo. 2014-26.
2Id. at *6.
3Id. at *11 (about one-half of the stock was concentrated in
four companies: Exxon Mobil, Merck & Co. Inc., General Electric
Co., and Pfizer Inc.).
4Id. at *5-*6.
5Reg. section 20.2031-1(b).
6Richmond at *13.
7Id. at *14.
8Id. at *3-*4.
9Id. at *14, *16.
10Id. at *26.
11Id. at *23.
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tax liability.12 In terms of the estate tax valuation
standard, a willing buyer and a willing seller would
take a potential tax liability into account in arriving
at a purchase price for the stock. Approximately
87.5 percent of PHC’s portfolio value consisted of
unrealized appreciation that would generate an $18
million tax liability if sold on the date of death.13
The federal courts are split on how to adjust the
value of corporate stock to reflect the capital gains
burden that inheres in its appreciated assets. The
Eleventh and Fifth circuits require, as a matter of
law, that the NAV of a corporation be reduced on a
dollar-for-dollar basis by any BICG tax liability.14
This approach recognizes that the starting point for
the NAV method is a presumed liquidation that
would ‘‘give rise to a current tax liability reducing
value.’’15 The Tax Court and the Second and Sixth
circuits, on the other hand, suggest that in many
cases, the corporation will not be immediately liq-
uidated when it is sold but will remain intact,
allowing for indefinite deferral of the capital gains
tax.16
In line with the Eleventh and Fifth circuits, the
estate argued that PHC’s value should be reduced by
100 percent of the BICG tax liability.17 Noting that its
opinion is appealable to the Third Circuit,18 the Tax
Court denied this discount because a rational hy-
pothetical willing buyer would not likely liquidate
PHC on purchase.19 Accordingly, the inherent tax
liability would be deferred, rather than immediately
due and payable. In the court’s view, ‘‘The seller of
[a] company with [a] contingent future liability
would demand a higher price than the seller of a
company with [an] unconditional current liability.
As a result . . . we find that a 100 percent discount
would be unreasonable because it would not reflect
the economic realities of PHC’s situation.’’20 In ar-
riving at its proffered discount, the government’s
expert analyzed the correlation between the built-in
gain and NAV discounts for closed-end funds.21 Al-
though the Tax Court dismissed this method as ‘‘not
supported by the facts,’’ it viewed the resulting dis-
count (15 percent of NAV or $7.8 million) as a con-
cession by the commissioner.22
After rejecting both parties’ approaches,
Gustafson made his own calculation of the BICG tax
discount, stating that ‘‘the most reasonable discount
is the present value of the cost of paying off that
liability in the future.’’23 Rather than an immediate
liquidation, the present value method assumes that
the corporation’s assets will be sold in the future,
and it discounts the prospective tax liability back to
the valuation date.24 To calculate present value, a
turnover rate for the corporation’s assets must be
estimated.25 Based on PHC’s historically slow rate
for selling its securities, the government’s expert
suggested 70 years as an appropriate holding pe-
riod.26 Gustafson rejected that estimate as allowing
PHC’s ‘‘unique, subjective investment goals to dic-
tate the value of the company.’’27 A rational actor,
the court said, would heed the advice previously
given to PHC to diversify its holdings. The court
accepted as reasonable the testimony of the Ser-
vice’s expert that ‘‘a potential investor would expect
that a portfolio like PHC’s would turn over within
a period of 20 to 30 years.’’ Using 20 and 30 years,
alternatively, as the proper holding period,
Gustafson calculated a range of present values for
PHC’s BICG tax liability.28 Since the government’s
$7.8 million concession fell within this range, the
court accepted that as the proper discount.29
12See generally Scott Andrew Bowman, ‘‘Built-In Gain Dis-
counts for Transfer Tax Valuation: A Resolution for the BIG
Debate,’’ 24 Akron Tax J. 117 (2009); Robert P. Schweihs, ‘‘Valu-
ation Adjustment for Built-In Capital Gains in a C Corporation,’’
Willamette Management Associates Insights 25 (Summer 2012),
available at http://www.willamette.com/insights_journal/12/
summer_2012_4.pdf; Louis A. Mezzullo, ‘‘Built-In Capital Gains
Tax Discount: A Tale of Two Theories,’’ Bloomberg BNA,
available at http://www.bna.com/builtin-capital-gains-n8589
935011/.
13Richmond at *8.
14Estate of Jelke v. Commissioner, 507 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2007);
Estate of Dunn v. Commissioner, 301 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2002).
15Richmond at *29-*30.
16Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 530 (1998); Estate of
Eisenberg v. Commissioner, 155 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1998); Estate of
Welch v. Commissioner, 208 F.3d 213, 2000 WL 263309 (6th Cir.
2000).
17Richmond at *29.
18The Third Circuit has not yet opined on the issue. Under
the Golsen rule, the Tax Court gives effect to its ‘‘own views in
cases appealable to courts whose views have not yet been
expressed.’’ Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970).
19Richmond, T.C. Memo. 2014-26, at *32. Although the court
does leave open the possibility that on different facts, a dollar-
for-dollar reduction could be warranted. According to
Gustafson, We ‘‘do not face here a circumstance in which the
facts about the assets and the market would make it inevitable
that any informed buyer would expect to liquidate the company
immediately and thus immediately bear the tax liability for the
built-in gain.’’ Id. *31, n.19.
20Id. at *32.
21Id. at *33.
22Id. at *35.
23Id. (citing Estate of Jensen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2010-182; Estate of Litchfield v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-
21).
24See Schweihs, supra note 12, at 26-27.
25See Mezzullo, supra note 12.
26Richmond at *36.
27Id.
28Id. at *38-*39 (using the different discount rates employed
in various contexts in the case ranging from 7 to 10.27 percent).
29Id. at *39.
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Discounts for Lack of Control and Marketability
A willing buyer would demand a discount for
the lack of control associated with Richmond’s
minority interest in PHC. Both parties used data
from closed-end mutual funds to estimate the dis-
count for lack of control. The government’s expert
chose the mean of the data set (6.7 percent),30 while
the estate’s expert picked the median (8 percent).
After adjusting for outliers, the court selected the
average of the revised data set (7.75 percent) as a
reasonable discount for lack of control.
There is no ready market for selling stock in PHC
because it is a family-owned, non-publicly traded
corporation. All parties agreed that a valuation
adjustment for lack of marketability was warranted,
but they disagreed on the amount of that discount.
Both sides examined seven studies of restricted
stock that produced lack of marketability discounts
ranging from 26.4 to 35.6 percent.31 The IRS selected
the figure at the absolute bottom of this range and
the estate argued for the value at the very top of the
range. The court chose 32.1 percent as the proper
marketability discount, a number that represented
the average of the discounts in the data set.
Accuracy-Related Penalty
Most surprisingly, the Tax Court sustained the
commissioner’s imposition of a 20 percent penalty
for a substantial estate tax valuation understate-
ment.32 Mechanically applying the statute,
Gustafson noted that the estate’s reported valuation
of PHC ($3.1 million) was less than 65 percent of
PHC’s value as determined by the court ($6.5
million).33 Accordingly, the burden shifted to the
estate to show that the underpayment of tax was
made in good faith and due to reasonable cause.34
The estate failed to carry this burden. According
to the court, clients cannot rely blindly on advisers
or an appraisal to establish good faith.35 Rather,
taxpayers must analyze both the appraisal and the
appraiser.36 The estate’s executors (one of whom
was a CPA) retained Peter Winnington of the ac-
counting firm Belfint, Lyons & Shuman to value the
decedent’s PHC stock. Based on the company’s
history and financials, information about stock
transactions in the 1990s, and prior estate tax valu-
ations, Winnington valued PHC at $3.1 million,
providing an unsigned draft of his valuation report
to the executors.37 Without ever asking him to
finalize it, the estate used Winnington’s draft report
as its basis for the PHC valuation reported on Form
706.
The estate did not offer Winnington as an expert
at trial and did not explain or defend Winnington’s
report. Instead, the estate argued that PHC was
difficult to value, as evidenced by the fact that four
different professionals (Winnington, the IRS audi-
tor, and the experts offered at trial by each of the
parties) reached four different conclusions.
Gustafson agreed but considered that fact as an
argument in favor of hiring a qualified valuation
professional. In the court’s opinion, to invoke the
reasonable cause exception, the ‘‘estate needed to
have the decedent’s interest in PHC appraised by a
certified appraiser.’’38 Although Winnington did not
meet this standard, he did have prior valuation
experience (10 to 20 valuation reports and testified
in court).39 Furthermore, he was a CPA and finan-
cial planner with a bachelor’s degree in accounting
and a master’s degree in taxation.40 Winnington
also had 20 years of experience in public accounting
involving audits, management advice, litigation
support, and tax services.41
Ultimately, the court concluded that the estate
failed to act with reasonable cause and good faith
‘‘in using an unsigned draft report prepared by its
accountant as its basis for reporting the value of the
decedent’s interest in PHC on the estate tax re-
turn.’’42 What is left unclear by this holding is how
much each of the following contributed to the
imposition of the penalty: (1) the use of an unsigned
draft report by the estate as its basis for PHC’s
reported value; (2) Winnington’s lack of valuation
expertise; and (3) the estate’s failure to explain why
at trial it abandoned the value reported on the
estate tax return.
30The commissioner’s expert then rounded that number
down to 6 percent in order to reflect that ‘‘though the decedent
did not control the company, the decedent’s 23.44 percent
interest was a large and influential block.’’ Id. at *41. The court
rejected this adjustment. Id.
31Id. at *44.
32Section 6662(a), (b)(5), (g).
33Section 6664(c)(1). The court noted that the ‘‘$3.1 million
value reported on the estate tax return was less than 65 percent
of even the $5 million defended by the estate’s own expert.’’
Richmond at *50.
34Section 6664(c)(1).
35Richmond at *48.
36Reg. section 1.6664-4(b)(1) (providing that factors to be
considered in determining good faith and reasonable cause
include ‘‘the methodology and assumptions underlying the
appraisal, the appraised value, the relationship between ap-
praised value and purchase price, and the appraisers relation-
ship to the taxpayer or to the activity in which the property is
used’’).
37Richmond at *13.
38Id. at *50.
39Id. at *13.
40Id.
41Id.
42Id. at *49.
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Conclusion
There are two key issues to track should the
estate decide to appeal this ruling. First, what will
the Third Circuit’s position be in the existing BICG
tax liability valuation discount debate? The ap-
proach of the Eleventh and the Fifth circuits is
simple and consistent. The Tax Court’s approach,
on the other hand, is more complex but may be
more accurate. Second, will the substantial valua-
tion penalty hold up on appeal? Will Winnington’s
credentials, deemed substandard by the Tax Court,
nevertheless impress the Third Circuit? Even if they
do, will the penalty be sustained because the estate
used an unsigned draft report as the basis for PHC’s
reported value? Whether Richmond is appealed or
not, it sends a clear message to practitioners about
the danger of using a noncertified appraiser to
report an aggressive valuation on an estate tax
return.
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